Abstract. It has been an open problem for a number of years to construct an identity-based fully homomorphic encryption (IBFHE) scheme (first mentioned by Naccache at CHES/CRYPTO 2010). At CRYPTO 2013, Gentry, Sahai and Waters largely settled the problem by presenting leveled IBFHE constructions based on the Learning With Errors problem. However their constructions are not bootstrappable, and as a result, are not "pure" IBFHE schemes. The major challenge with bootstrapping in the identity-based setting is that it must be possible to noninteractively derive from the public parameters an "encryption" of the secret key for an arbitrary identity. All presently-known leveled IBFHE schemes only allow bootstrapping if such an "encryption" of the secret key is supplied out-of-band. In this work, we present a "pure" IBFHE scheme from indistinguishability obfuscation, and extend the result to the attribute-based setting. Our attribute-based scheme is the first to support homomorphic evaluation on ciphertexts with different attributes. Finally, we characterize presently-known leveled IBFHE schemes with a view to developing a "compiler" from a leveled IBFHE scheme to a bootstrappable IBFHE scheme, and sufficient conditions are identified.
Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic primitive that facilitates arbitrary computation on encrypted data. Since Gentry's breakthrough realization of FHE in 2009 [1], many improved variants have appeared in the literature [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Leveled FHE is a relaxation that supports evaluation of circuits of limited (multiplicative) depth. Such a limit L is specified in advance of generating the parameters of the scheme. The size of the parameters along with the size of keys and ciphertexts are allowed to depend on L. In the public-key setting, a leveled FHE scheme can be transformed into a "pure" FHE scheme (i.e. a scheme supporting evaluation of circuits of unlimited depth) via Gentry's bootstrapping theorem [1] .
In brief, the process of bootstrapping entails using the scheme to homomorphically evaluate its own decryption circuit. More precisely, ciphertexts in existing FHE schemes contain a level of "noise". As long as this "noise" remains below a certain threshold, decryption can be performed correctly. The goal of bootstrapping is to return the noise to a reduced level, so homomorphic operations can continue to be performed. This is achieved by publishing encryptions of the secret key bits, and homomorphically evaluating the scheme's decryption circuit on a "noisy" ciphertext to produce a ciphertext with less noise.
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is centered around the notion that a user's public key can be efficiently derived from an identity string and system-wide public parameters / master public key. The public parameters are chosen by a trusted authority along with a secret trapdoor (master secret key), which is used to extract secret keys for user identities. The first secure IBE schemes were presented in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin [7] (based on bilinear pairings), and Cocks [8] (based on the quadratic residuosity problem).
At his talk at CHES/Crypto 2010, Naccache [9] mentioned "identity-based fully homomorphic encryption" as an open problem. At Crypto 2013, Gentry, Sahai and Waters presented the first identity-based (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption scheme [6] , largely settling the problem raised by Naccache, which had been further explored in [10, 11] .
Achieving fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) in the identity-based setting turned out to be quite a tricky problem, for a variety of reasons. Prior to [6] , there were two paradigms for constructing leveled FHE:
1. Gentry's original paradigm based on ideals, which was introduced in [1] (works which built on this include [2, 3]); and 2. Brakersi and Vaikuntanathan's paradigm based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem [4, 5] entailing techniques such as relinearization, modulus switching and dimension reduction.
It appeared like there was limited potential for obtaining identity-based FHE from the first paradigm because no secure IBE schemes had been constructed with this structure; that is, roughly speaking no IBE scheme associated an identity with an ideal, and a secret key with a "short" generator for that ideal. The second paradigm appeared more fruitful. Starting with the work of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) [12] , constructions of IBE from LWE had emerged [13] [14] [15] . But it was not straightforward to adapt Brakersi and Vaikuntanathan's (BV) ideas to the identity-based setting. The main reason for this is that BV-type FHE relies on having "encryptions" of some secret key information, termed an evaluation key. If a user directly supplies this information to an evaluator out-of-band, then evaluation can be accomplished as in BV. IBE schemes where the evaluation key can be generated by the key holder, but cannot be derived non-interactively, have been termed "weak" [10, 11] . Due to the difficulty of non-interactively deriving an "encryption" of secret key information for a given identity (based on public information alone) meant that the BV paradigm also seemed inhospitable to IBE.
Recently Gentry, Sahai and Waters (GSW) [6] developed a new paradigm from LWE where the secret key is an approximate eigenvector of a ciphertext. Their construction is both elegant and asymptotically faster than existing FHE schemes. Furthermore, it does not rely on an evaluation key, which means that it can be adapted to support IBE. In fact, a "compiler" was proposed in [6] to transform an LWE-based IBE satisfying certain properties into an
